Outbreak of Antiviral Drug–Resistant Influenza A in Long-Term Care Facility, Illinois, USA, 2008 by Dharan, Nila J. et al.
Outbreak of Antiviral 
Drug–Resistant 
Inﬂ  uenza A in 
Long-Term Care 
Facility, Illinois, 
USA, 2008 
Nila J. Dharan,1 Monica Patton,1 Alicia M. Siston,2 
Julie Morita, Enrique Ramirez, Teresa R. Wallis, 
Varough Deyde, Larisa V. Gubareva, 
Alexander I. Klimov, Joseph S. Bresee, 
and Alicia M. Fry
An outbreak of oseltamivir-resistant inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) 
occurred in a long-term care facility. Eight (47%) of 17 and 
1 (6%) of 16 residents in 2 wards had oseltamivir-resistant 
inﬂ  uenza A virus (H1N1) infections. Initial outbreak response 
included treatment and prophylaxis with oseltamivir. The out-
break abated, likely because of infection control measures.
O
utbreaks of inﬂ  uenza virus infection cause illness and 
death, especially among residents of long-term care 
facilities (LTCFs). In addition to annual vaccination and in-
fection control measures, antiviral agents for treatment and 
prophylaxis are useful components for control of inﬂ  uenza 
outbreaks in LTCFs (1–4), especially in years with vaccine 
strain mismatches (4).
Two classes of antiviral agents are licensed for use in 
the United States: adamantanes (amantadine and rimanta-
dine) and neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zana-
mivir). Circulation of inﬂ  uenza A viruses resistant to both 
classes of antiviral agents, A (H3N2) to adamantanes and 
A (H1N1) to oseltamivir, was reported during the 2007–08 
inﬂ  uenza season (5). We describe an outbreak of illness 
in an LTCF caused by 2 inﬂ  uenza viruses, an oseltamivir-
resistant A virus (H1N1) and an adamantane-resistant A 
virus (H3N2), during January 2008.
The Study
The LTCF in Illinois provides housing, healthcare 
services, and recreational activities for residents with neu-
rologic and developmental medical conditions. During the 
outbreak, the LTCF housed 583 residents. Building A, the 
main site of the inﬂ  uenza outbreak, housed 108 residents 
in 6 wards; 104 (96%) received the 2007–08 inﬂ  uenza vac-
cine. Of the 685 LTCF employees involved in direct patient 
care, 385 (56%) received the 2007–08 inﬂ  uenza vaccine 
on site.
We deﬁ  ned a conﬁ  rmed case as a positive rapid or 
reverse transcription–PCR result for inﬂ  uenza virus from 
January 20 through February 8, 2008, in a resident of the 
LTCF. Surveillance for new case-patients included obtain-
ing a nasopharyngeal specimen from all residents with new 
onset of fever or respiratory symptoms or any unusual be-
havior within 24 hours after illness onset. All specimens 
were tested by using the QuickVue A and B Inﬂ  uenza Test 
(Quidel, San Diego, CA, USA). A second specimen was 
obtained from all persons with positive rapid test results and 
some (57%) from persons with negative results for conﬁ  r-
mation of inﬂ  uenza virus infection and virus subtyping by 
reverse transcription–PCR. Medical records, vaccination 
records, resident activity, and visitor logs were reviewed.
Testing for antiviral drug resistance was conducted di-
rectly on clinical specimens by pyrosequencing as described 
(6,7), including identiﬁ  cation of the oseltamivir resistance–
conferring H274Y mutation in the neuraminidase gene of 
inﬂ  uenza viruses (H1N1) (H275Y in N1 numbering) and 
the adamantane resistance–conferring mutations in the ma-
trix 2 protein (7,8). The HA1 portion of the hemagglutinin 
(HA) gene of the outbreak viruses was sequenced and com-
pared with those of epidemiologically relevant viruses.
Phylogenetic analysis of HA1 was performed by using 
MEGA version 4.0.1 software (9). A phylogenetic tree was 
inferred by using maximum composite likelihood available 
in MEGA version 4.0.1. The outbreak investigation was 
considered a public health response and granted exemption 
from review by the Institutional Review Board of the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention.
On January 27, the ﬁ  rst 3 residents with fever or respi-
ratory symptoms in ward 1 within building A were positive 
for inﬂ  uenza A virus infection by rapid test (Figure 1). On 
January 28, outbreak infection control measures were initi-
ated in all 6 wards, including surveillance for new cases, 
5 days of treatment with oseltamivir for conﬁ  rmed cases, 
and 14 days of prophylaxis with oseltamivir for all healthy 
residents in wards with conﬁ  rmed case-patients (2). Con-
ﬁ  rmed case-patients were quarantined in their rooms for 
10 days; all residents in all 6 wards were quarantined for 
10 days, and visitor movement was restricted. Staff and 
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and practice respiratory and hand hygiene. Prescriptions 
for prophylactic courses of oseltamivir and inﬂ  uenza vac-
cinations were offered to all staff of building A; uptake was 
not recorded.
From January 28 through January 31, 2008, a total of 
6 additional conﬁ  rmed case-patients were identiﬁ  ed. Eight 
(47%) of 17 residents in ward 1 and 1 (6%) of 16 residents 
in ward 2 were infected with inﬂ  uenza A viruses (H1N1) 
that contained the H274Y mutation but did not have mark-
ers of resistance to adamantanes or zanamivir.
On January 30, high fever developed in a male resident 
in ward 3 while on the ﬁ  rst day of a home visit (Figure 1). 
He returned to building A on January 31, was positive for 
inﬂ  uenza by rapid test, and was placed in ward 2 in an at-
tempt to group him with other already ill residents. Because 
of an ongoing outbreak in other nearby wards, oseltamivir 
prophylaxis was initiated for all residents in ward 3 who 
were not ill. On February 1, symptoms developed in 2 other 
residents in ward 3 who were positive for inﬂ  uenza by rap-
id test. Three (18%) conﬁ  rmed cases of inﬂ  uenza A virus 
(H3N2) resistant to adamantanes but sensitive to oseltami-
vir were detected among 17 residents in ward 3. Additional 
cases, but no clusters, were detected in other buildings 1–2 
weeks later.
Characteristics of case-patients are shown in the Ta-
ble. Establishing a ﬁ  rm epidemiologic link between cases, 
other than ward of residency, was not possible. Antivi-
ral drug resistance results became available on February 
7 when all case-patients had completed their treatment 
courses. Ongoing prophylaxis courses were changed: os-
eltamivir was replaced with rimantadine in ward 1, and 
rimantadine was added to oseltamivir in ward 2. Prophy-
laxis with oseltamivir alone was continued in ward 3. 
Zanamivir could not be used by most residents because of 
underlying conditions.
Sequence analysis of the HA1 gene in outbreak inﬂ  u-
enza A viruses (H1N1) showed identical or nearly iden-
tical sequences, differing by only 1 or 2 nt (Figure 2). 
These viruses were phylogenetically more closely related 
to A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1) than to the A/Solomon 
Islands/3/2006, the inﬂ  uenza A virus (H1N1) strain in the 
2007–08 inﬂ  uenza vaccine. GenBank accession numbers 
of HA (HA1) sequences for the 9 oseltamivir-resistant in-
ﬂ  uenza A viruses (H1N1) are FJ231752–FJ231760.
Conclusions
The attack rate of illness caused by oseltamivir-re-
sistant inﬂ  uenza A viruses (H1N1) in ward 1 was within 
the range (20%–80%) reported for other facility inﬂ  uenza 
outbreaks (1,10,11), indicating effective person-to-person 
transmission of oseltamivir-resistant inﬂ  uenza A viruses 
(H1N1). Nosocomial transmission of oseltamivir-resis-
tant inﬂ  uenza A viruses (H1N1), with possible healthcare 
worker involvement, has been described (12). We were un-
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Figure 1. Number of cases of inﬂ  uenza by date of symptom onset 
and outbreak control protocol during an inﬂ  uenza A outbreak in a 
long-term care facility, Illinois, USA, 2008. Retrospective medical 
chart review of all nontested building A residents identiﬁ  ed  1 
potential missed case-patient with inﬂ   uenza who had symptom 
onset on January 29. Additional cases were detected in 2 other 
residential buildings in the long-term care facility (buildings B 
and C). Building B housed 53 residents in 4 wards and building 
C housed 16 residents in 1 ward. All (100%) of residents in both 
buildings had received the 2007–08 inﬂ  uenza vaccine. Of the 16 
rapid test specimens with negative results from all 3 buildings that 
were subjected to conﬁ  rmatory testing, 5 (31%) were positive by 
reverse transcription–PCR for inﬂ  uenza A virus (H1N1).
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Figure 2. Phylogenetic analysis of the hemagglutinin gene (HA1 
portion) of inﬂ  uenza A viruses (H1N1) isolated during an inﬂ  uenza 
A outbreak in a long-term care facility, Illinois, USA, 2008. Viruses 
from buildings A and B shared nearly identical sequences. One of 
the viruses from building B was more similar in sequence to 1 virus 
from building A. However, this ﬁ  nding could reﬂ  ect natural variance in 
circulating viruses. Red indicates outbreak viruses, boldface italics 
indicates vaccine strain for 2008–09, boldface indicates vaccine 
strain for 2007–08, and arrows indicate nucleotide differences in 
HA1 subunit. Scale bar indicates nucleotide substitutions per site.Outbreak of Antiviral Drug–Resistant Inﬂ  uenza A
able to assess staff illness in this investigation. Before the 
2007–08 inﬂ  uenza season, transmission of neuraminidase-
resistant inﬂ  uenza viruses had rarely been reported (13).
Although we documented a relatively high attack rate 
in 1 ward (ward 1), and despite resistance to the antivi-
ral agent initially used, the outbreak abated quickly. High 
annual vaccination rates among residents and relatively 
high rates among employees (2) may have played a role in 
limiting the spread of the outbreak viruses. However, the 
A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1)–like outbreak viruses were 
not optimally matched to the A/Solomon Islands/3/2006 
(H1N1) vaccine strain (14). Also, infection control mea-
sures, such as isolation and quarantine, likely played a role 
in controlling this outbreak.
The proportion of circulating inﬂ  uenza viruses resistant 
to oseltamivir increased from 12% during the 2007–08 sea-
son to 99% during the 2008–09 season in the United States, 
and new interim guidelines for use of antiviral agents were 
released in December 2008 (15). These guidelines were up-
dated for the 2009–10 season to account for the emergence 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in September 2009 (www.
cdc.gov/h1n1ﬂ  u/recommendations.htm). This outbreak un-
derscores the possibility of 2 inﬂ  uenza A viruses, with dif-
ferent antiviral susceptibilities, in the same facility. During 
a facility outbreak of inﬂ  uenza, providers should consult 
antiviral recommendations of the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention and obtain inﬂ  uenza virus typing and 
subtyping to guide appropriate antiviral drug choices.
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